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Can we entirely erase a temporary memory representation from mind? This question
has been addressed in several recent studies that tested the speciﬁc hypothesis that a
representation can be erased from visual working memory based on a cue that indicated
that the representation was no longer necessary for the task. In addition to behavioral
results that are consistent with the idea that we can throw information out of visual working
memory, recent neurophysiological recordings support this proposal. However, given the
inﬁnite capacity of long-term memory, it is unclear whether throwing a representation out
of visual working memory really removes its effects on memory entirely. In this paper, we
advocate for an approach that examines our ability to erase memory representations from
working memory, as well as possible traces that those erased representations leave in
long-term memory.
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Many science ﬁction plots involve the erasure of memory (Dick,
1966; Rowling, 2000), yet surprisingly little is known about the
plausibility of erasing information from memory. Recent evi-
dence indicates that information can indeed be erased from
working memory (part of this work referred to this operation
as purging, but we will use erasing throughout this paper to
be consistent; Williams and Woodman, 2012; Maxcey-Richard
and Hollingworth, 2013). These empirical reports suggest that
this seemingly futuristic process can be accomplished within our
own minds with our onboard hardware and software. This is
particularly noteworthy because the classic theoretical view of
workingmemory is that information is only lost from this limited-
capacity store through displacement by new information (e.g.,
Waugh and Norman, 1965). However, does this mean that we
will have no memory for the information erased from working
memory?
If we can completely erase representations from all memory
stores, then this would have important real-world implications.
For example, if we learn that a warning signal, a classmate, or
an eyewitness has been providing unreliable information, then
we could retroactively eliminate the information they had pro-
vided from memory. Indeed, people commonly act as though
this is possible in the United States legal system. When a judge
sustains an objection in the courtroom, she gives the jury instruc-
tions to disregard a line of questioning. However, ﬁndings from
long-term memory studies have resulted in conﬂicting conclu-
sions. One group of studies demonstrates the intentional erasure
of information from long-term memory (Johnson, 1994; Badde-
ley et al., 2009), consistent with long-standing claims of beneﬁts
of such forgetting (Freud, 1946;Weiner, 1968; Anderson and Levy,
2009). In contrast, another group of studies suggests that erasing
information from long-term memory might not typically occur
(e.g., Bulevich et al., 2006; Storm et al., 2008, but see Anderson
and Green, 2001), or at least is not necessary given the seem-
ingly inﬁnite capacity of long-term memory (Standing, 1973;
Brady et al., 2008). Multistore models of memory propose that
information passes through a capacity-limited working memory
before reaching long-term memory if it is rehearsed in work-
ing memory for a sufﬁcient period of time (e.g., Atkinson and
Shiffrin, 1968). The erasure or replacement of information pre-
viously encoded into working memory could effectively wipe
out those temporary memory representations (e.g., Ecker et al.,
2010). But, this opens up the possibility that when we erase
previously relevant information from working memory, a repre-
sentation of that information may continue to linger in long-term
memory.
Our goal in this paper is to review recent ﬁndings that purport
to show that we can erase information from working memory
while discussing possible explanations about what is going on in
long-term memory during these paradigms. This will result in
speciﬁc predictions and clearly advocate for neuroscientiﬁc meth-
ods to provide converging evidence that tests these predictions.
We begin by discussing behavioral ﬁndings that suggest that sub-
jects can erase working memory representations following cues
that indicate certain memory representations are irrelevant to the
task they are performing.
Maxcey-Richard and Hollingworth (2013) examined the top-
down control of what information ismaintained in visual working
memory during online scene viewing. The basic paradigm they
created simulated the real-world task of ﬁxating objects sequen-
tially. For example, if we search for an apple in the bin at the
farmer’smarketwe begin by assigning priority to one of the objects
(e.g., remembering the most appealing candidate apple). Then we
maintain that representation across subsequent shifts of attention
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and the eyes (e.g., continuing the search and ﬁxating other, less
appealing apples). However, upon encountering a better candi-
date apple we need to ﬂexibly reassign priority to representing
that new object in memory.
In the laboratory task of Maxcey-Richard and Hollingworth
(2013), subjects were shown a workshop scene to simulate the
demands of this foraging task. Semantically appropriate objects
(e.g., hammer, drill) sequentially appeared in ecologically valid
locations throughout the scene and subjects were instructed to
make a saccade to each new object when it appeared and the cur-
rently ﬁxated object simultaneously disappeared. They were then
instructed to maintain ﬁxation on that object until a new object
appeared. Each trial consisted of 6–10 objects drawn from a set
of 10 paired token objects (e.g., two ﬁre extinguishers, two screw-
drivers). Eye movements were monitored with a camera-based
eye tracker to ensure subjects followed instructions. Subjects were
instructed that each trial would end with a token discrimination
task, testing memory for an object that was present in the trial.
In order to indicate which object should be prioritized during
the trial, the appearance of each object was accompanied by an
auditory tone. A high-pitched tone served as a cue indicating the
object that was likely to be tested (e.g., simulating the best candi-
date apple). A low-pitched tone indicated an object was not likely
to be tested (e.g., simulating the other less appealing apples). Crit-
ically, some trials included two high-pitched tones. Subjects were
instructed that in the event of two high-pitched tones, the second
cued object was the to-be-remembered object and the originally
cued object was in fact least likely of all the objects to be tested
(e.g., simulating changing prioritization from the former most
appealing apple to a new, more appealing apple). This condi-
tion created an “erased” object (e.g., the original best candidate
apple).
Across three experiments, Maxcey-Richard and Hollingworth
(2013) found that memory for the erased item was not reliably
different from memory for objects that were never cued. In con-
trast, memory for the cued object on trials with only one cue
and memory for the most recently cued object on trials with two
cues were better remembered than all the other objects. These
behavioral results indicate that when an object is rendered irrele-
vant, visual working memory for that object returns to baseline,
despite its previous status as the prioritized object. Now we will
discuss neurophysiological evidence that also indicates that sub-
jects can erase working memory representations when cued to
do so.
Williams and Woodman (2012) directed subjects to forget a
subset of amemory array while examining an event-related poten-
tial (ERP) component, the contralateral delay activity (CDA),
known to index the maintenance of items in visual working mem-
ory (Vogel andMachizawa, 2004; Vogel et al., 2005;Woodman and
Vogel, 2008). As shown in Figure 1, subjects in their study were
presented with six colored squares, drawn from a set of seven col-
ors, three in each hemiﬁeld. After a delay, subjects were cued to
forget one lateralized group of the array upon presentation of the
words “LEFT” or “RIGHT”on the screen 250 ms into the 2200 ms
retention interval. The authors found that instructing subjects to
forget the items in one hemiﬁeld appeared to eliminate the CDA
indexing those forgotten items, as would be expected if the items
FIGURE 1 | A portion of the ERP results fromWilliams andWoodman
(2012) Experiment 3, Figure 8.The waveforms fromT5/6 relative to the
tested items on trials with a directed forgetting cue. When subjects were
cued to forget all the objects in one hemiﬁeld, a CDA emerged. Adapted
from “Directed forgetting and directed remembering in visual working
memory” by Williams and Woodman (2012; Adapted with permission).
were erased from visual working memory and only the remain-
ing items were maintained. In a subsequent study, Williams and
colleagues (Williams et al., 2013) sought to test the proposal that
the items that subjects were cued to forget were in fact erased
from memory. They did this by including a handful of trials that
probed subjects’ memory for the items they were cued to forget.
Using a cued recall procedure (e.g., Zhang and Luck, 2008), they
found that subjects had essentially no information in memory
about the representations they were cued to forget. These ﬁnd-
ings clearly suggest that the contents of working memory change
based on cues that certain items can be forgotten. However, these
ﬁndings do not rule out the possibility that information about
the items erased from working memory remains in long-term
memory.
Although these papers concluded that subjects can success-
fully erase information from working memory, these conclusions
hinge on the tasks purely tapping the process of strategically man-
aging working memory without the contributions of long-term
memory. Frequently when we study working memory, we do not
consider the process purity of the tasks (but see Lin and Luck,
2012). If we predict what kind of effect long-term memory was
to have during the tasks that we reviewed above we can expect
it to be one of creating proactive interference in which the long-
termmemory representations from the previous trials will make it
harder to remember what was presented on the current trial (e.g.,
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Underwood, 1957). This is because the experiments we described
above used a small set of stimuli and repeated them frequently
across trials. Frequent repetitions of a small set of stimuli ren-
der long-termmemory an unreliable source of information about
what appeared on any given trial because the activation of all rep-
resentations would have roughly the same net value. Therefore, we
propose that the superior memory for target objects in the stud-
ies reviewed above was due to their storage in working memory.
However, if these recent studies had not used a small set of stimuli,
then the activation state of objects’ long-term memory represen-
tations would have reliably differed in a useful way within and
across trials. That is, without proactive interference the state of
long-term memory representations is sufﬁcient to guide perfor-
mance. Indeed, theoretical perspectives have stated that one of the
primary roles of working memory may be to overcome proactive
interference when it has built up or task demands change (Kane
and Engle, 2002; Woodman et al., 2013).
Understanding the relationship between working memory and
long-termmemory in these erasing paradigms is of central impor-
tance to current disagreements over the relationship between these
memory systems in general. For example, it is possible that work-
ing memory is just the activated portion of long-term memory
(Cowan, 1995, 2001, 2005; Oberauer, 2002, 2009). If this is correct,
then the mechanism driving the erasure from working memory in
the studies we reviewed above may be the same mechanism that
prevents information from rising to the level of awareness during
long-termmemory retrieval (Anderson et al., 1994; Anderson and
Green, 2001; Anderson and Levy, 2009).
To simulate the inhibition that one attempts to exert in
response to the initial activation of an undesired memory, Ander-
son and Green (2001) used a think/no-think paradigm. In the
think/no-think paradigm, subjects learn word pairings such that
they can be presented with one of the paired words and retrieve
the second word. Then in the think/no-think phase, they are again
presented with one of the paired words but in either a color that
suggests they should retrieve the second word or in another color
that indicates they should not retrieve the secondword. The test of
whether subjects are successful at preventing the no-think words
from entering conscious awareness is accomplished by comparing
memory in a ﬁnal test phase between think, no-think, and base-
line items. The critical ﬁnding is that successful suppression of
the no-think items during the think/no-think phase is exhibited
by poorer recall in this ﬁnal test phase for the no-think items.
It may be the case that this successful suppression is actually
accomplished by simply not allowing these items into working
memory. In contrast, it is possible that failures to keep long-term
memory representations out of working memory could under-
lie the failures to see evidence for memory suppression in this
paradigm (e.g., Bulevich et al., 2006), particularly given that the
ability to keep task-irrelevant information out of workingmemory
may underlie differences in capacity limits across individuals (e.g.,
Vogel et al., 2005). This possibility highlights the importance of
understanding the relationship between working and long-term
memory and the extent of strategic control we have over this
relationship.
The relative contributions of working memory and long-term
memory are difﬁcult to determine from behavioral data alone.
Indeed, it is sometimes debated whether working memory even
exists, or whether a single type of memory underlies behavior
of healthy humans and neuropsychological patients (Ranganath
and Blumenfeld, 2005). Therefore, we propose that neuroscientiﬁc
measures are required to establish the relationship between these
memory systems and explain the effects described above. Specif-
ically, we argue that two ERP components might be particularly
useful in revealing whether it is possible to truly erase a representa-
tion from memory altogether. The anterior P1, also known as the
P170 (Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman, 2004; Diana et al., 2005; Voss
et al., 2010; Reinhart and Woodman, 2013), and the FN400, also
known as the frontal old/new effect (Rugg et al., 1998), are elicited
by the activation of information retained in long-term memory.
The anterior P1 is measured at frontocentral sites and is more
positive when a subject correctly identiﬁes an object that is stored
in visual long-term memory (Tsivilis et al., 2001). The FN400,
measured at mid-frontal sites, is more positive when subjects are
presented with familiar objects (Rugg et al., 1998). Both of these
frontal long-term memory ERPs have been proposed to operate
below the explicit awareness of the subject, providing measures
of information storage that can be more sensitive than behav-
ioral measures (Tsivilis et al., 2001; Duarte et al., 2004; Friedman,
2004; Rugg and Curran, 2007; Voss et al., 2010; Paller et al., 2012).
This means that it should be possible to determine whether infor-
mation that subjects attempted to erase, nonetheless leaves the
residue of information in memory. Similar hypotheses could be
tested in a straightforward way using multivariate pattern analy-
ses in functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments (e.g.,
Norman et al., 2006). These methods are well suited to deter-
mine whether information exists in the brain when out of view
(e.g., Polyn et al., 2005), and these same methods could be used to
determine if memories linger in the brain even after experimental
procedures and behavior suggest they should have been erased.
Our hope is that future studies can deﬁnitively determine whether
representations that have been erased fromworkingmemory leave
residue in long-term memory by measuring these types of brain
activity.
Recall that the Maxcey-Richard and Hollingworth (2013)
paradigm drew 6–10 objects on each trial from a total set of 10
token objects (20 total stimuli) and the Williams and Woodman
(2012) study used six colored squares on each trial, drawn from a
total set of seven color squares. These are precisely the conditions
that result in high proactive interference among the representa-
tions in long-term memory (Wickelgren, 1966). Indeed, it has
been proposed that frequent repetitions of a small set of stimuli
are necessary to isolate the contribution of working memory to
the performance of a task (Cowan, 2001; Lin and Luck, 2012) ren-
dering long-term memory unreliable on a given trial. This means
that the studies we reviewed here may have found evidence for
the complete erasure of information from memory because peo-
ple can control what is stored in working memory, but that the
potential contributions from long-term memory were not possi-
ble to observe due to a buildup of proactive interference. As we
discussed above, evidence that working memory changes based
on a cue does not mean that long-term memory would not have
a representation of that information in a situation where proac-
tive interference is low. We predict that when stimulus sets repeat
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frequently, as in the studies we reviewed above, contributions from
long-term memory are minimal and erasing representations from
working memory results in no behavioral evidence for storage of
the representation in anymemory store. However, if the long-term
memory ERPs were measured during these paradigms, we predict
that we would see evidence for the residue of the erased repre-
sentations in memory, below a level that contributes to subjects’
overt behavior. Moreover, when stimuli do not repeat frequently,
we predict that contributions from both long-term memory
and working memory can be measured with both ERPs and
behavior.
Thus, we propose that answering the question of whether infor-
mation can be erased from memory may do much more than just
answer that question of interest to science ﬁction readers. Instead,
we believe that this line of research may answer long-standing
questions about thenature ofmemory. For example, are theremul-
tiple memory stores? Do we have the ability to provide top-down
control over the contents of our memories? Is it truly possible for
a jury to disregard a line of questioning under the direction of a
judge?
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